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Animalism and the Corpse Problem
Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield
abstract:  The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal
looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism).  Some critics,
however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism.
According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with
a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our
not being animals.  I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not
affect the case for animalism.
1.
I believe that we are animals.  That is, each of us is numerically
identical with a human organism, a member of the species Homo sapiens.  I
hold this view--'animalism'--because I believe that human animals are the
obvious candidates, as it were, for being us.  There is a human animal that
sits at your desk and sleeps in your bed, and which you see when you look in
a mirror and which other people point to when they point to you.  What is
more, that animal can think.  It is physically indistinguishable from you, with
the same surroundings and causal history.  What could prevent it from using
its brain to think?  In fact that animal ought to think in exactly the way that
you think.  It ought to think your thoughts.  If you and the animal think
differently, or if you think and the animal does not think at all, there ought to
be some explanation for this difference.  The explanation cannot appeal to
your physical properties or your surroundings or your causal history, for you
and the animal do not differ in any of these respects.  And it is hard to see
what else could explain it.
There seems, then, to be an animal sitting there, where you are,
thinking your thoughts and reading these words.  It is tempting to infer from
this that you are that animal--that you and the animal are one and the same.
For if the animal were not you, there would be two beings there, you and the
animal, thinking the same thoughts.  How could you ever know which one you
are?  Any reason you could have for believing that you are not the animal
would equally be a reason for the animal to believe that it is not the animal.
Yet it would be mistaken.  If we were not animals, we could never have any
reason to believe that we are not.  No one who accepts this can believe that
we are anything other than animals.
This argument has three premises:  (1) There is a human animal
located where you are.  (2) That animal thinks.  In particular, it has the same
thoughts as you have.  (3) If you share your thoughts with a being other
than yourself, you cannot know that you are not that being.  It follows that if
animalism is false--if we are not animals--we could never know it.  Those
who claim that we are not animals must reject one of these premises.  They
must either deny that there is any human animal where you are, deny that
that animal thinks as you do, or insist that even if you share your thoughts
with the animal, you can still somehow know that you are not it.  There is no
other way round the argument.  The apparent existence of thinking human
animals is a serious problem for opponents of animalism.  Let us call it the
thinking-animal argument, or thinking-animal problem.
2.
Not everyone sees it this way, however.  Several influential critics
argue that insofar as the thinking-animal argument supports animalism, a
similar argument undermines that view [Shoemaker 1999a: 295, 1999b:
499f., Baker 2000: 207f.].  Suppose you are an animal.  Unless your death
is unusually violent, the critics say, it will result in a lifeless corpse.  Where
will that corpse come from?  It can hardly come into being when you die.
One's death does not create a new material object.  Your corpse must exist
before you die as well as afterwards (though of course we don't call it a
corpse then).  So there is, even now, a material object located where you
are that will come to be a corpse if you die peacefully:  your body or
'corpse-to-be'.
Now your body ought to be able to think.  It is physically
indistinguishable from you, with the same surroundings and causal history.
What could prevent it from using its brain to think?  In fact your body ought
to think in exactly the way that you think.  So there is a human body sitting
there thinking your thoughts and reading these words.  It is tempting to infer
from this that you are that body.  For if it were not you, there would be two
beings there, you and your body, thinking the same thoughts.  How could you
ever know which one you are?  Any reason you could have for believing that
you are not your body would equally be a reason for the body to believe that
it is not your body.  Yet it would be mistaken.  If we were not bodies, we
could never have any reason to believe that we were not.  No one who
accepts this can believe that we are anything other than our bodies.
If we are animals, however, we cease to exist when we die.  At least
that is what most animalists say:  no living organism can come to be a
corpse.  So animalism implies that we are not identical with our bodies.  The
problem for the animalist is now evident.  How could we ever know that we
are not our thinking bodies?  And if for all we know we are bodies, then for
all we know we are not animals, for bodies are not animals.  So we could
never know that we are animals.
That is something that no animalist can accept.  If animalists are to
resist this argument, they must reject one of its premises.  Their options,
say the critics, are analogous to those facing the anti-animalist:  they can
deny that there is any human body located where you are; they can deny
that that body can think as you do; or they can insist that even if you share
your thoughts with your body, you can still somehow know that you are not
that body.  There is no other way round the argument.  And these options
look no more palatable than those available to the anti-animalist.  The
apparent existence of thinking human bodies looks as much a problem for
the animalist as the apparent existence of thinking human animals is for the
anti-animalist.  Thus is the animalist's best weapon turned against him.  Call
this the corpse argument or corpse problem.
Animalists must solve the corpse problem.  But the critics claim that
any such solution will suggest an equally viable solution to the thinking-
animal problem.  If animalists can deny that our bodies think, for instance,
then anti-animalists can deny on similar grounds that human animals think.
Or if animalists can explain how we might know that we are not the corpses-
to-be that share our thoughts, anti-animalists should be able to explain how
we could know that we are not the animals that share our thoughts.
Animalists can defend their view only if the opposing view is equally
defensible.
This may look like a dialectical stalemate:  animalists and anti-
animalists face similar problems to do with the existence of beings other
than ourselves thinking our thoughts; and they have similar prospects for
solving those problems.  No one wins.  But the animalist may come off
worse.  The thinking-animal argument is the principal support for animalism.
If it fails--if there are no human animals, or if human animals cannot think,
or if we can know that we are not the human animals that think our
thoughts--then it is hard to see how there could be any reason to suppose
that we are animals.  Anti-animalists have it better.  Even if the corpse
argument gives no support to the view that we are not animals, there are
other arguments for that view, arguments whose persuasive force is
independent of the corpse argument.  Most notably, there is the deep and
abiding conviction that our identity conditions are different from those of
animals.  It is widely held, for instance, that our identity over time must
somehow involve some sort of psychological continuity.  And animalists and
anti-animalists alike agree that no sort of psychological continuity is either
necessary or sufficient for a human animal to persist [Olson 1997: 89-93,
114-119].  Psychological facts are simply irrelevant to questions about
animal identity.  These two convictions rule out our being animals.  The
thinking-animal problem may pose an interesting challenge for the opponents
of animalism.  But the corpse problem threatens to put animalism out of
business.
3.
I say that the critics are mistaken.  Their central claim is that the
thinking-animal problem and the corpse problem are on a par:  one can be
solved only if the other can be solved as well.  I disagree.  I will sketch two
ways in which animalists might plausibly solve the corpse problem, and show
that neither corresponds to any analogous solution to the thinking-animal
problem.  (Nor, as far as I can see, can anti-animalists solve the thinking-
animal problem in any other way, though I will not argue for that claim here.)
Let us begin by examining the corpse argument in more detail,
numbering the premises.  First, it says, (1) your death will ordinarily result in
a lifeless corpse.  That is, the matter that makes you up just before you die
will make up a corpse afterwards.  (2) Your corpse does not come into
existence when you die, but exists and coincides with you, as your body,
while you are alive.  (3) Your body now thinks as you do.  (4) If you coincide
with a body that thinks as you do, you cannot know that you are not that
body.  But (5) your body is not an animal, for animals necessarily cease to
exist when they die.  That is, the human animal sitting in your chair is not
your body or corpse-to-be.  Thus, you cannot know that you are an animal.
Some animalists deny premise 1 [van Inwagen 1990, Merricks 2001].
They concede that there are particles 'arranged corporeally' after your
death, but deny that those particles compose any larger object then.
Strictly speaking, they say, there are no corpses.  We might call this view
'corpse eliminativism'.  If it is true, the existence of corpses cannot pose a
problem for animalism.  The analogous solution to the thinking-animal
problem would be to deny that particles 'arranged organically' ever compose
animals.  Whether these are sensible things for animalists or their opponents
to say is a large question that we cannot consider here.  Let us see whether
animalism can be defended by less drastic measures.
Suppose, then, that there are such things as lifeless corpses.  Let us
also grant for the sake of argument that our corpses do not come into being
when we die, but exist and share their matter with us while we are alive
(premise 2 of the corpse argument).  It follows that your body--the thing
that will one day be your corpse--is sitting in your chair now.  It is alive (in
the biological sense).  It is composed of the same matter as the animal
sitting there.  It is, in fact, physically indistinguishable from that animal.  But
if animals and their bodies are as similar as that, we ought to wonder
whether they really are different things.  Why not say that your body is the
animal, rejecting premise 5 of the corpse argument?
Well, animals were supposed to be different from their bodies because
animals stop existing when they die.  But do they?  That is a substantive
metaphysical claim.  There is nothing obvious about it.  Nor does it follow in
any obvious way from the claim that we are animals.  Whether we are
animals is one question; what it takes for animals to persist is another.  So
animalists needn't accept it.  And not all do:  some animalists say that we
'survive' death as dead animals--corpses--and cease to exist altogether only
when our remains turn to dust [Ayers 1991: 224f.; Feldman 1992: 89-105,
2000; Carter 1999; Mackie 1999].  They have ordinary language on their
side:  we speak as if there were dead animals (and dead people) that were
once alive.  If they are right, then 'your' animal--the one sitting where you
are--will one day be a corpse.  Your body or corpse-to-be is an animal.  In
that case the existence of a body thinking your thoughts does not imply that
there is a second thinker sitting there in addition to the animal, and is
therefore no threat to the claim that you are an animal.  That would solve
the corpse problem.
If an animal's body is just that animal, then the existence of thinking
bodies is not a problem for animalism.  But those who deny that we are
animals still face a problem about thinking animals.  To solve the thinking-
animal problem in an analogous way would be to identify the person with the
animal.  And that is just animalism.  So here is a way of defending animalism
against the corpse problem that suggests no analogous defense of anti-
animalism against the thinking-animal problem.
4.
For all that, I suspect that organisms do cease to exist when they die
[Olson 1997: 131-138].  This is no eccentric view:  Aristotle and Locke held
it, and several contemporary figures do too [Furth 1988: 156f., Locke
1975: 330f., van Inwagen 1990: 142-158, Wilson 1999: 89-99].
One thought behind this view is that despite their superficial
resemblance, a lifeless corpse appears to be a very different sort of thing
from a living organism.  A corpse, like a marble statue, maintains its form
merely by virtue of the intrinsic stability of its materials.  The stability of a
living thing, by contrast, is dynamic.  Matter constantly flows through it, in
much the same way as it flows through a fountain (Miller 1978: 140).  A
living thing maintains its form--in particular the fine biochemical structure
that makes it alive--only by engaging in constant activity:  repairing damage,
removing waste, fighting infection, acquiring and digesting food, and so on.
All of this comes to an end when the organism dies.  Matter ceases to flow.
The repairs stop.  Decay sets in.  It is this irreversible process that we call
death.  If ending an organism's life appears less dramatic than shutting off a
fountain, that is because some of an organism's materials--its solid parts--
are more stable than those of a fountain.  But even its solid parts 'flow'.
Of course, the death of an organism is not usually instantaneous.
There are times when it is difficult to say whether we have a living thing or a
corpse.  There may even be cases where it is genuinely indeterminate (just
as there may be cases where it is indeterminate whether a person still exists
according to standard psychological-continuity accounts of personal
identity).  Cases where an organism's death occurs in conjunction with
hypothermia or freezing are especially problematic, as these conditions
arrest the process of decay.  The difference between a living organism that
is near death and a fresh corpse may appear slight.  But this shows at most
that there are cases on the borderline between life and death, or that there
is room for dispute about what point in the spectrum ranging from clearly
living things to clearly lifeless ones counts as death.  It does not show that
there is no important distinction between living things and corpses.
To put it differently, a living organism has what Locke called a life:  a
complex, self-sustaining, physico-chemical event that imposes a remarkably
constant form upon ever-changing particles.  It is the motor that runs the
fountain.  The possession of a life appears to be what distinguishes
organisms from non-organisms.  If organisms are essentially organisms, or if
nothing can be an organism at one time and a non-organism at another, then
what it takes for an organism to persist ought to something to do with its
life.  The proposal that comes most readily to mind is that an organism
persists if its life continues, and perishes when its life ceases and cannot be
restarted:  that is, when it dies.  This cannot be what it takes for a corpse to
persist.  So the persistence conditions of living organisms seem unlike those
of corpses.
We can sharpen this point by asking what the alternative could be.
What does it take for an organism to persist, if not the continuation of its
life?  Well, an organism's life might figure in its identity over time in some
less direct way.  Some suggest that an organism persists for as long as the
arrangement of its particles is caused in an appropriate way by the activities
of its life (Ayers 1991: 222-225, Mackie 1999: 236f.).  That is:
For any x that is an organism at a time t and any y that exists at a later
time t*, x=y if and only if y's particles at t* are arranged as they are at t*
in large part because of the activities of x's life at the last time between t
and t* when that life was going on.
Call this the causal-dependence account of organism identity.  It allows for
an organism to persist beyond its death as an indisputably lifeless corpse:  as
long as the corpse remains reasonably intact, its particles will be arranged as
they are then in large part because of the activities of the organism's life
when it was last alive.
This proposal raises many questions:  for instance, about the extent to
which the arrangement of a dead organism's parts must be caused by the
activities of its life (how much decay or tampering can the corpse survive?),
and about what sort of causal link is appropriate (an object's particles may
owe their arrangement to an organism's life via some 'deviant' causal chain
in cases where no one would suppose that the object was the late organism).
Since virtually all accounts of the persistence of complex objects raise
similar questions, however [Shoemaker 1979], I won't press this.  I worry
that the causal-dependence account is more deeply flawed.  Suppose an
animal dies and its remains are burnt to ashes, but one finger remains intact
(an ordinary finger, not one magically capable of growing into a complete
human being).  The lone finger's parts will be arranged as they are because
of the activities of the animal's life when it was last going on.  And this is not
a case in which the causal link between the organism's life and the detached
finger is tenuous or deviant.  The causal-dependence account therefore
appears to imply that the animal survives this adventure as a finger.  I take
that to be false.
There are many ways in which the account might be amended to avoid
this consequence.  The most obvious proposals, however, introduce
problems of their own.  For instance, you might think that the lone finger is
not the original organism because it has too few of that organism's parts,
and add to the account a clause stating that y must retain, at t*, a
significant proportion (perhaps more than half) of the particles that were
caught up in x's life when it died.  But the persistence of an organism seems
to have nothing to do with its retaining a certain number or proportion of its
parts.  An organism can survive the loss of any number of its parts, through
metabolic turnover or even radical surgery, as long as its vital organs remain
intact or appropriate life-support machinery is provided.  The reason why the
detached finger is not the original organism is not that it is too small or has
too few of that organism's original parts.
A more promising idea is that the finger is not the original animal
because it is not an organism at all.  One might then add to the account a
clause stating that y must be an organism at t*.  But what makes something
an organism?  Not its having a life, if an organism can persist as a lifeless
corpse.  Perhaps an organism is something that once had a life:  a dead
organism is something that was once a living organism.  But that would make
the account useless.  In order to find out whether the lone finger is identical
with the original organism, we should first have to know whether it was once
a living organism.  That is, we should have to know which non-living things
were once living things.  But that is just the point at issue, or at any rate a
large part of it.  If we knew which non-living things were once living things at
all, it would be relatively easy to say which living things those non-living
things once were.  And here the proposed account offers no guidance.
Once we admit that a living organism can persist as a corpse, it is
surprisingly difficult to say why it should be unable to persist as a lone
finger.  Now it would be rash to conclude at this point that the problem is
insoluble and that no acceptable account of animal identity can allow for
animals to persist as corpses.  But no such account has ever been proposed.
What if there is none?  What if an animal really must cease to exist when it
dies?  Does the corpse problem then threaten?  I think not.  Any reason for
supposing that an animal must cease to exist when it dies is equally a reason
for supposing that an animal's corpse comes into being when the animal
dies.  The reason for thinking that animals cannot survive death is that living
organisms and lifeless corpses appear to be so different as to have different
and incompatible persistence conditions.  But if this prevents animals from
persisting through death, it ought to prevent corpses from doing so as well.
So if animals cease to exist when they die (as premise 5 of the corpse
argument has it), there is no apparent reason to suppose that your corpse
exists both before and after you die (premise 2), and therefore no reason to
suppose that living human animals coincide with corpses-to-be numerically
different from them.  Once again, the corpse problem dissolves.
This too suggests no analogous way of resisting the thinking-animal
argument, for the latter employs no premise analogous to the claim that
one's body exists both before and after one dies.
5.
The corpse argument is founded on two metaphysical principles:  that
human bodies can exist both before and after their death, and that no animal
can do so.  Though these principles may be individually plausible, we have
seen that they are not plausible together:  any reason to suppose that a
human body can persist through death is equally a reason to suppose that a
human animal can persist through death, and any reason to deny that an
animal can persist through death is a reason to deny that its body can do so.
So we have found no reason to suppose that an animal's body coincides with
the animal while it is alive and continues to exist after the animal passes
away.  The worry that human animals might coincide with thinking bodies
numerically different from them is groundless.  Animalists needn't lose sleep
over thinking corpses-to-be.  But anti-animalists ought to fear thinking
animals.
I have one final point.  Some readers will know that Baker and
Shoemaker put the corpse problem differently from the way I laid it out in
section 2 above.  In their version it is directed against what we might call the
foetus argument, which is meant to undermine psychological-continuity
accounts of personal identity and support animalism.  The foetus argument
goes something like this:
You developed from an unthinking foetus.  But you are not in any way
psychologically continuous with that foetus.  So the view that some sort of
psychological continuity is necessary for you to persist implies that you
are not identical with the foetus; rather, you must have come into being
when the foetus reached a certain point in its development--presumably
when certain mental capacities arose.  But of course (say the animalists)
the foetus did not cease to exist when this happened.  It grew into an
adult, just as you did.  So that ex-foetus, which is presumably a human
animal, is now physically indistinguishable from you, with the same
surroundings and causal history.  It ought, therefore, to be thinking your
thoughts now.  If, as the psychological-continuity view implies, that animal
is not you, then there are two thinking beings sitting there and reading
this.  How could you ever know which one you are?  The obvious way to
avoid this problem is to reject the psychological-continuity account and
accept that you are that ex-foetus, which is to say that you are an animal.
But if animalists admit that you are numerically different from the corpse
that succeeds you, we might wonder how they can confidently assert that
you must be identical with the foetus that gives rise to you.  Why should
your not being the foetus be any worse than your not being the corpse?  The
critics conclude that far from supporting animalism, the foetus argument
undermines it by laying animalists open to the charge that each human
animal coincides with a thinking body numerically different from it.  That is,
if the foetus argument is sound, the corpse argument ought to be sound as
well.
We can now see the flaw in this reasoning.  Once again, the case for
supposing that animals stop existing when they die and are numerically
different from the lifeless remains they leave behind was that what it takes
for a living organism to persist appears incompatible with what it would take
for a corpse to persist.  The critics claim that if this is right, there is no
reason to deny that a human foetus ceases to exist when it reaches the
relevant stage in its development, and is immediately replaced by a
numerically different organism.  That is, we might as well say that it is
absolutely impossible for an organism to survive the onset of whatever
feature it is that gives rise to a person.  (Not that the critics believe this
about foetuses.  Their claim is simply that if animalists can deny that living
animals are identical with corpses, then the critics can deny that mature
animals are identical with foetuses.)
But the cases are disanalogous.  No one can seriously believe that the
persistence of a human foetus after the crucial stage in its development
involves something entirely different from the persistence of a foetus before
that stage--so different that no one has managed to give plausible
persistence conditions that apply to both.  The natural view, surely, is that
the foetus persists through all of this by virtue of whatever it is that animal
identity consists in:  the continuation of its Lockean life, perhaps.  The
absurd claim that a human foetus is doomed to perish before it is born gets
no support from the idea that living organisms do not persist as corpses.
Once again, the critics' case collapses.
I conclude that our being animals is not threatened by the metaphysics
of corpses.
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